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Power grids, road maps, and river streams are examples of infrastructural networks which are
highly vulnerable to external perturbations. An abrupt local change of load (voltage, traffic density,
or water level) might propagate in a cascading way and affect a significant fraction of the network.
Almost discontinuous perturbations can be modeled by shock waves which can eventually interfere
constructively and endanger the normal functionality of the infrastructure. We study their dynamics
by solving the Burgers equation under random perturbations on several real and artificial directed
graphs. Even for graphs with a narrow distribution of node properties (e.g., degree or betweenness),
a steady state is reached exhibiting a heterogeneous load distribution, having a difference of one
order of magnitude between the highest and average loads. Unexpectedly we find for the European
power grid and for finite Watts-Strogatz networks a broad pronounced bimodal distribution for the
loads. To identify the most vulnerable nodes, we introduce the concept of node-basin size, a purely
topological property which we show to be strongly correlated to the average load of a node.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 05.10-a, 43.25.Cb
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INTRODUCTION
Blackouts, traffic gridlocks, and floods are all malfunc-
tions of infrastructures which drastically affect their per-
formance [1–5]. In many situations, they occur abruptly
and might propagate through the network as shock waves
[6–9]. These waves can either weaken by shedding their
impact among branches or interfere constructively when
two or more branches meet at the same node. The global
consequences of these perturbations will strongly depend
on the propagation dynamics and the capacity of each
network element to bear abrupt changes [10–12]. The
identification of vulnerable spots is a challenging scien-
tific and technological question and this is precisely what
we address here.
Propagation of failures and cascading in complex net-
works have been subject of much scientific interest [13–
15]. Examples are the use of the theory of self-organized
criticality to study the propagation of failures in power
grids and water transport on reservoir networks [1, 3, 16–
20], the Olami–Feder–Christensen model for earthquakes
[21, 22], traffic [2, 23, 24] and financial networks [25].
Typically, the focus is on the cascading of failures re-
sulting from an initial triggering event. However, it is
also crucial to understand the dynamics preceeding these
failures and identify the vulnerable spots where they can
possibly be triggered.
To describe the propagation of shock waves on directed
networks we use the Burgers equation [26]. This equa-
tion describes flow when the flux depends quadratically
on the load (e.g., voltage, traffic density, and water level).
The range of applications of the Burgers equation goes
beyond fluid dynamics as it is applied in many propa-
gation processes, such as traffic jams, glacier avalanches
or chemical processes [27, 28]. Here we show that, in
the case of perturbations randomly distributed in space,
the dynamics of the solutions of the dissipative Burgers
equation converges to a steady state in which the load
distribution is strongly heterogeneous. Surprisingly, we
find that the load of some nodes can exceed the aver-
age load by one order of magnitude. One might expect
that the location of such nodes mainly depends on the
propagation dynamics. Yet, we show that their fate is
deeply imprinted in the network topology. We propose
a new topological measure which allows to identify the
most vulnerable nodes without solving the dynamics.
MODEL
Dynamics—To describe the propagation of load (e.g.,
traffic density or water level) on a directed network, we
consider on each link the one-dimensional Burgers equa-
tion [27]
∂ρ
∂t
+ ρ
∂ρ
∂x
= 0, (1)
which we solve using Godunov’s scheme. The details of
the discretization and numerical solution are presented
in the section Methods.
Perturbation—Initially, the load on all directed edges
and nodes is set to zero. Perturbations are described as
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2FIG. 1. Spatial distribution of load on the European power grid in the steady state for a particular realization of the voltage
distribution. The size of the nodes corresponds to the average load allocated on them. The smallest size refers to zero load,
where the largest one to the maximum load.
local changes in the load according to the following pro-
cedure. First, we choose a node i at random and set ρi to
a fixed value ρ0 (ρ0 > ρi) during a time interval Tp. The
load on the corresponding edges and on the other nodes is
determined by solving the Burgers equation as described
in the section Methods. After Tp, the constraint on the
load of node i is released and its load is determined by
the dynamics. A new node is selected and perturbed and
the procedure is iterated. In addition to the perturba-
tions, at each iteration step, 0.1% of every node load is
dissipated. This dissipation would correspond, for exam-
ple, to the evaporation of water from a river network,
cars leaving the streets, or a potential drop due to Joule
heating.
Directed networks—The dynamics is investigated on
the European high-voltage power grid [29] and two net-
work models: the configuration model with power-law de-
gree distribution [30–33] and the Watts-Strogatz model,
with small-world features [34]. In the case of the model
networks, the length of the edges are random variables
chosen uniformly from the interval [3:20]. Initially, the
power grid and the model networks are undirected. In-
spired by the fact that in power grids the direction of the
current depends on the node voltages, we use the follow-
ing method to define the direction of the link. To each
node i, a random value φi (the node voltage) is assigned
uniformly from the interval [0:1] and the edge between
two nodes is directed from the node with higher volt-
age to the one with lower voltage (i.e., φsource > φtarget).
This method for generating directed edges automatically
prevents the presence of loops. Since fluctuations are al-
ways present in the network, the direction of the current
3can vary in time. Our results are averaged over different
voltage distributions as well.
RESULTS
Steady state—At each time step, we measure the tem-
poral load correlation, defined as:
∆ρ(t) =
〈∣∣∣∣ρ(t′)− ρ(t′ − 100Tp)ρ(t′)
∣∣∣∣〉
t′
(2)
where ρ(t) is the load averaged over all nodes at time
t. The brackets represent an average over the last ten
consecutive time intervals of length 100Tp, i.e., t
′ = t −
n100Tp with n = 0, 1, . . . , 10.
Starting with all loads equal to zero, we observe that
∆ρ decays in time towards a steady state in which the dis-
sipation balances the total incoming load. When ∆ρ(t)
drops below 1% of the relative standard deviation of the
loads within the network, we assume that the steady state
is reached. In the steady state, the load at each node has
a well-defined average value with small fluctuations. The
spatial distribution for a given realization of voltages in
the European power grid is shown in Fig. 1. The size
of the dots represents the average load over a time win-
dow of 1000Tp measured in the steady state. Most nodes
accumulate negligible load (ρ ≈ 0), while surprisingly a
small fraction of the nodes are overloaded (ρ > 10ρ0,
where ρ0 is the magnitude of each perturbation).
The observed load exemplarily shown in Fig. 1 corre-
sponds to one realization of the voltage distribution and
thus for one configuration of the direction of the edges.
Assuming small temporal changes in the network (e.g.,
fluctuations of voltage in the power grid or number of
cars entering a road junction), the direction of the edges
changes in time. Thus, we also consider different realiza-
tions of the voltage distribution and, for each realization,
we determine the steady state load distribution. Figure 2
shows the relative load distribution averaged over 5000
realizations. In order to compare the load distribution
of different networks (power grid, Watts–Strogatz and
scale-free networks), loads in each curve are rescaled by
the magnitude of each perturbation (ρ0). The strongly
inhomogeneous behavior of the steady-state load seen in
Fig. 1 is also visible in the load distribution. The distri-
butions are bimodal defining two different types of nodes:
those with a negligible load compared to the perturba-
tion (ρ < ρ0) and those with a larger load (ρ > ρ0). The
latter ones are typically overloaded in the steady state,
suggesting that the incoming perturbations interfere con-
structively at them.
The plots for the two network models (Watts–Strogatz
and scale-free) in Fig. 2 are obtained for networks with
the same number of nodes as the power grid. The aver-
age degrees are also kept close to the power grid, with
the same number of edges in the scale-free network and
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FIG. 2. Relative load distribution in the steady state for three
network topologies: power grid (green dots), scale-free (red
squares) and Watts–Strogatz networks (blue triangles). The
power grid and the scale-free network have N = 1254 nodes
and M = 1811 edges, while the Watts–Strogatz network has
N = 1254 nodes and an average degree of 〈kout〉 = 2. All
loads are in units of the amplitude of the perturbation. Each
curve is an average over 5000 voltage realizations and, in the
case of the model networks, also an average over 100 different
networks. The magnitude of the standard deviation of the
curves is comparable to the size of the symbols.
〈kout〉 = 2 in the Watts–Strogatz graph. In both cases,
a bimodal distribution is also observed. The power-grid
network is constructed from real data and its size corre-
sponds to the real network size. Thus, a finite-size study
is not possible. Yet, in the case of the model networks
one can systematically study the effect of the network
size on the load distribution. Figure 3A shows the load
distribution for Watts–Strogatz networks of different net-
work sizes. The majority of the nodes (more than 90%)
has always a negligible load, while the load of the remain-
ing nodes follows a broad distribution, characterized by
a decay in the relative frequency with increasing load
and a cut-off for values of load close to ρ0. The bimodal
distribution smoothens out for larger network sizes. For
scale-free networks the qualitative picture is slightly dif-
ferent. As shown in Fig. 3B, for all network sizes, one
observes two power-law regimes, with a crossover at ρ0.
Nevertheless, note that for both network models, there
is always a significant fraction of nodes (around 10%)
with a non-negligible load. The load value of the cutoff
suggests that, at large system sizes, consecutive shock
waves that enter the network are separated so that they
attenuate their amplitude before being able to interfere.
The specific nodes that exhibit these high load values
typically change from realization to realization. However,
after averaging over different voltage distributions, we
still find some nodes which are consistently overloaded.
For each distribution of voltages, we classify as “over-
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FIG. 3. Relative load distribution in the steady state for (A)
the Watts–Strogatz and (B) scale-free networks with 〈k〉 = 2
for different system sizes, insets show the respective data col-
lapse, where ρ and P denote the load and the relative fre-
quency, respectively, N is the size of the network. Loads are
divided by the magnitude of the applied perturbation to en-
sure comparability. Each data is averaged over at least 100
different graphs and 100 voltage realizations. The breaks in
the distributions around ρ = 10−3 are due to the logarithmic
binning.
loaded nodes” the ones with a load at least ten times
larger than the average. We define vulnerability of a
node as the probability that it is an overloaded node.
Figure 4A shows the spatial distribution of vulnerability
in the European power grid where the color and size of
the nodes denotes their vulnerability. The vulnerability
of green nodes is lower than 0.1%, while the one of the
red nodes is larger than 5%. All the other nodes (about
30% of the nodes, in dark olive color) have a vulnera-
bility between 0.1% and 5%. In comparison, the highly
vulnerable nodes are at least 50 times more frequently
exposed to large incoming fluxes. In the case of random
perturbations, vulnerable nodes are more likely to fail
or be congested. It is therefore crucial to identify these
nodes to improve their capacity and to mitigate the risk
of failure. Figure 5 shows the vulnerability distribution
corresponding to the map in Fig. 4A and to other net-
work topologies. In the case of the Watts–Strogatz and
scale-free networks, a vulnerability distribution for net-
works of size N = 105 are presented.
Identifying vulnerable nodes—Next we will introduce
a simple topological property of the nodes to identify
the vulnerable spots without solving the dynamics of the
Burgers equation. According to the Burgers equation,
each node sheds the incoming shock wave among its out-
edges and the total load agregated at the node at a time
t is the sum of incoming loads. Hence, if we track the
path of a given shock wave, it is fragmented at each node
with multiple out-edges and will stop at any node that
does not have any out-edges. Assuming that the time av-
erage of the load at a node is proportional to the number
of incoming shock waves, we determine the basin corre-
sponding to that node. For this purpose, let us consider
one realization of the edge directions (see Fig. 6). For a
given node (the one in red in Fig. 6), the corresponding
basin is defined as the smallest subgraph of the network
containing this node (as the sink), which is connected
to the rest of the network by outgoing edges. Following
the procedure as illustrated in Fig 6, we go through the
nodes following the opposite direction of the in-edges,
starting from the red node (Fig. 6A), and add nodes to
the basin that has only out-edges at the end of the pro-
cess (marked by the blue region in Fig. 6B). The resulting
subgraph is the basin of the red node, and the contribu-
tion of the load of the nodes in the basin is simply the
inverse of their out-degree (Fig. 6C), except for the initial
(red) node, that contributes to the load with unity. This
choice of the contribution of the nodes in the basin is
based on the fact that Eq. (4) conserves the flux at each
node. For simplicity, we assume here that the amplitude
of the shock waves leaving a node is on average the same
for each out-edge.
We calculated the size of the basins for each node, de-
fined as the sum of contributions from all nodes inside the
basin of the corresponding node. This basin size (which is
determined for one voltage distribution) is then averaged
over different voltage configurations. The resulting basin
size distribution is depicted in Fig. 4B for the power-grid
network. One sees that for this network, the distribution
of the node-basin size is very similar to the distribution
of the vulnerability. A quantitative comparison of the
two properties can be given by their correlation. Thus,
we plot the rank-rank scatter plots in Fig. 7 of the in-
dices of the nodes after being sorted in ascending order
by vulnerability and node-basin size. The plots are the
average over 5000 voltage distributions and over 100 dif-
ferent topological realizations of model networks.
The corresponding product-moment correlations ρSp
of the ranks [35] are given above the plots, showing
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FIG. 4. Spatial distribution of two properties on the power grid network. (A) Vulnerability of the nodes obtained solving
the Burgers equation (probability of having 10ρ in a voltage realization). (B) Node-basin sizes averaged over different voltage
realizations. Color and size indicate the strength of the corresponding property: red corresponds to large vulnerabilities (> 5%)
and basin sizes (> 10), while green nodes have negligible vulnerabilities (below 0.5%) and small basin sizes (close to 1). The
data are the average over 5000 voltage realizations.
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FIG. 5. Distribution of the vulnerabilities (i.e., the probabil-
ity of having a load ten times larger than the average) for three
different network topologies: power grid (green circles), scale-
free network (red squares) and Watts-Strogatz graph (blue
triangles). The data for the model networks are the average
over 100 network realizations.
strong correspondence between the ranked vulnerability
and node-basin size for the power grid and scale-free net-
works. The crucial nodes are the ones with large vulner-
ability since they are more exposed to large loads. The
basin size shows a strong correlation with the vulnerabil-
ity for these large values (top right corner of the scatter
plots), meaning that it is a good estimator of vulnerabil-
ity. Watts–Strogatz network exhibits much less correla-
tion because the degree distribution is extremely narrow,
that is, deviations from the average degree are negligible.
Thus, for each realization, the differences in the loads
from node to node are very small. This conclusion is
also supported by Fig. 5 showing a narrow vulnerability
distribution for Watts–Strogatz networks.
DISCUSSION
We study the propagation of shock waves on directed
networks using the Burgers equation. Under sequentially
applied perturbations and constant dissipation, the dy-
namics approaches a steady state. In this steady state,
most of the nodes have negligible average load and a sig-
nificant fraction of the total load is localized on a few
nodes. We found that some nodes are more likely to ac-
cumulate load even after averaging over many edge direc-
tion configurations. These nodes (the vulnerable nodes)
are more likely to fail, when there is a finite capacity of
the load they can bear. Unexpectedly we find for the
European power grid a broad pronounced bimodal dis-
tribution for the loads, while for scale-free network the
distribution resembles more a power law.
The steady state and thus the probability distribu-
tion of vulnerability among the network is determined
by solving numerically the partial differential equations
of Eq. (1) on each edge. The propagation velocity of
the shock waves depends on their amplitude, which can
vary rapidly throughout the network. We propose a sim-
pler alternative based on the node-basin size to estimate
the vulnerability of the nodes and identify the most vul-
nerable ones. Simulations on a real network (European
high-voltage power grid) and on scale-free networks show
that the node-basin size can predict very accurately the
location of vulnerable nodes while it performs worse for
the Watt-Strogatz network due to its narrow degree dis-
tribution.
Our results suggest that it is possible to establish a
remarkable connection between dynamics and network
structure. Although for many networks the node-basin
size seems to be an accurate tool in predicting the dis-
tributions and detecting vulnerability, it is only the first
step towards a complete description of the steady state.
More might be understood by studying the relation be-
tween the most vulnerable nodes: under what circum-
stances are they separated or forming connected sub-
graphs? Is any local property of the network responsible
for a node being highly vulnerable? This information
would provide the tools to mitigate the risk of systemic
failure. Further investigation may involve the removal of
nodes that reach their capacity. In this case, the study
of the time evolution of the network structure or optimal
strategies of dynamical node/edge addition or deletion
can be of relevance.
METHODS
Dynamics—In this section, we describe the general-
ization of Eq. (1) on a directed network. The numerical
solution of the one-dimensional Burgers equation can be
discretized using Godunov’s scheme [36, 37]
ρt+1i = ρ
t
i +
∆t
∆x
[ in−flow︷ ︸︸ ︷
F (ρti−1, ρ
t
i)−
out−flow︷ ︸︸ ︷
F (ρti, ρ
t
i+1)
]
, (3)
where ρti is the load at the mesh point i at time t, ∆x
and ∆t are the spatial and temporal discretizations, and
F (ρ, η) = ρ˜
2
2 is the flux. The value of ρ˜ is given as follows
[36]: If ρ ≥ η then
ρ˜ =
{
ρ if ρ+η2 > 0
η otherwise
,
otherwise,
ρ˜ =
 ρ if ρ > 0η if η < 0
0 if ρ ≤ 0 ≤ η
.
To solve this equation on a network, one needs to fix
the direction of each link in order to have a precise defi-
nition of the in- and out-flux of a mesh point. For practi-
cal purposes, this is a realistic approach as water always
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FIG. 6. Calculation of the node-basin size. (A) The basin corresponding to the red node is considered. (B) We determine
the smallest subgraph containing the red node and having only out-edges to the rest of the network. This is equivalent to a
breadth-first search traversing the fraction of the graph reached through only in-edges. (C) When the basin is determined, each
node in the basin contributes to the red node’s basin size by the inverse of its out-degree. The contribution of the red node
(i.e., the sink of its basin) is unity.
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FIG. 7. Scatter plots of the ranked vulnerability and node-basin sizes for three different networks: (A) power grid, (B) scale-free
and (C) Watts–Strogatz network. The axes on the plots indicate the corresponding ranked property, and the color denotes the
number of nodes for which the two ranks were identical. In other words, the color of a dot at (x, y) corresponds to the number
of nodes with vulnerability rank of x and node-basin size rank of y (see the colorbars). All plots are the average over 5000
voltage realizations. In the case of model networks, 100 different realizations are considered.
flows downhill and the current follows a decreasing gra-
dient in electric potential. Our discretization model for
the edges and nodes is illustrated in Fig. 8. The edges of
a network are one dimensional and thereby Eq. (3) holds.
The number of mesh points in each edge is proportional
to its length and the direction is defined by the direction
of the edge [38]. Furthermore, a value of ρk is assigned
to each node k. Nodes interact with the nearest mesh
points of their incident edges according to the following
equation,
ρt+1i = ρ
t
i +
in−edges︷ ︸︸ ︷
∆t
∆x
∑
j∈Bini
F (rˆtj , ρ
t
i)
− ∆t
∆x
∑
k∈Bouti
F (ρti, rˆ
t
k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
out−edges
. (4)
Bini (B
out
i ) denotes the set of in- (out-) edges of node i,
and rˆj (rˆk) is the load at the last (first) mesh point of the
corresponding edge. The resulting dynamics conserves
the total mass and at each node, the total incoming flux
is equal to the outgoing one.
Also, we should add an important remark on the var-
ious constraints of the investigated model. First, in the
numerical solution of a nonlinear PDE on a network, the
degree of a node corresponds to the local dimension of the
space in which one solves the equations. As the size of
the scale-free network increases, the frequency of nodes
with very large degrees also grow. Considering numer-
ical stability, the appearance of larger degrees sets an
upper limit on the magnitude of the applied perturba-
tions. However, if the perturbations are small (which is
required by the numerical treatment), shock waves tend
to vanish by travelling on the edges and they are not
able to interfere constructively. Therefore, in the finite-
size study, we considered only networks below the size of
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FIG. 8. Illustration of the discretization model on a directed
network. (A) Each edge corresponds to a one-dimensional
coordinate system with the positive direction defined by the
direction of the edge. xi denotes the ith mesh point on the
edge, xS and xT are the mesh points corresponding to the
source and target nodes, respectively. The load values on the
ith edge mesh point are denoted by ri. (B) The nodes interact
only with the nearest mesh points of their edges. rˆi denotes
the adjacent mesh point of the corresponding in- or out-edge
of the blue node and F is the flux according to Eq. (3).
N = 104.
Networks—We consider three network models: the Eu-
ropean power grid (with N = 1254 nodes and M = 1811
edges, i.e., 〈kout〉 = 1.44), the Watts–Strogatz small-
world network (〈kout〉 = 2) and scale-free network models
(〈kout〉 = 1.44 for N = 1254 and 〈kout〉 = 2 in the case
of large network sizes). The Watts–Strogatz network is
constructed by considering first a one-dimensional chain
with first and second neighborhood connections and pe-
riodic boundary conditions, and then rewiring each edge
with probability p = 0.01 (with undirected edges, this
corresponds to an undirected average degree 〈k〉 = 4).
After the voltages are set and edge directions are intro-
duced, the resulting network has a directed average de-
gree of 〈kout〉 = 2. The scale-free network is constructed
by the configuration model: first we assign the degrees
for each node according to a power-law with exponent
γ = 2.5, and then connect randomly chosen nodes. Fi-
nally, further rewiring of the edges is carried out in order
to eliminate degree-correlations. Note that the number
of edges in the Watts–Strogatz network is different from
that in the power grid and the scale-free network.
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